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 1 W. Rings, Die 5. Wand: Das Fernsehen, Wien, 1962.
 2 The concept of dispositif as developed by the 
French film theorist Jean-Louis Baudry character-
ises the specificity of a medium – in Baudry’s case 
of the cinema – as the result of  interrelation be-
tween three factors: technology (called «appareil 
de base»), content (the filmic text) and perception 
(the viewing). All three factors together create the 
«illusion of reality» as an intrinsic quality of the 
film as medium. See Frank Kessler, Notes on dis-
positif, online manuscript:_http://www.let.uu.
nl/~frank.kessler/personal/Dispositif%20Notes11– 
2007.pdf. 
The emergence of television in post-war Europe was a long and asynchronous pro-
cess. Despite the many faces that the new medium adopted according to the differ-
ent political and cultural environments in which it was embedded, the contempo-
raries commonly celebrated the advent of television as a revolutionary moment in 
the history of communication. The new «window to the world» or «fifth wall»1 was 
said to have the magic potential of transmuting the living room into an electronic 
space of exploration for millions of «armchair discoverers». 
This article revisits some of the popular narratives about the emergence of tele-
vision as a revolutionary moment in European mass media history by highlighting 
the struggles that the new medium encountered in the search for its medial iden-
tity. It focuses on a set of negotiations where the tensions between the conservative 
and modernising agencies of the medium became most visible or explicit. These 
sites reflect the three dimensions of the televisual dispositif: the technological or 
infrastructural «hardware», the institutional structure and the socio-cultural 
meaning of television as negotiated in early television discourse.2 The article 
explores the battles over the construction of a medial identity of television, and the 
diverging ambitions to establish national television infrastructures to promote 
national communion. It touches upon a number of interrelated questions: First, 
was television more an agent of national socialisation or of transnational imagina-
tion? Second, how do we qualify the «newness» of television as a medium entering 
the Western European mass media ensemble? Third, did the cultural and political 
function of television foster a «conservative media revolution» in post-war Western 
Europe? Can the emergence and establishment of television as a mass medium in 
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 3 This article builds on extensive literature and ar-
chival research that was gathered in the frame-
work of a VENI project, funded by the Nether-
lands Organisation for Scientific Research 
(NWO). The project concentrated on a compara-
tive historical analysis of the emergence of televi-
sion in Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands 
and France.   
 4 G. B. Pingree  / L. Gitelman, «What’s new about 
new media?», in: L. Gitelman  / G. B. Pingree 
(eds.), New Media 1740–1915, Cambridge/Mass. 
2003; W. Chun (ed.), New Media, Old Media. A 
History and Theory Reader, London 2006. The 
concept of remediation as developed by Bolter and 
Grusin argues that new visual media achieve their 
cultural significance by paying homage to, rival-
ling, and refashioning earlier media such as per-
spective painting, photography, film, and televi-
sion. See J. Bolter  / R. Grusin, Remediation. 
Understanding New Media, Cambridge/Mass. 
2000. 
 5 J. Bignell  / A. Fickers (eds.), A European Television 
History, Malden 2008; A. Fickers  / C. Johnson, 
«Transnational television history: a comparative 
approach. Introduction», in: Media History 16 
(2010) 1, 1–11.
 6 For a theoretical reflection on the concept of inter-
mediality and its consequences for an integral me-
most European countries during the 1950s and 1960s really be classified as a revo-
lutionary moment in media history?3 
To answer these questions, I propose analysing the advent of television as a 
new technology and emerging medium in an integrative media historical perspec-
tive by reflecting on the technological and infrastructural foundations of the Euro-
pean television landscape and investigating the political contexts that shaped the 
institutionalisation of the medium. Last but not least, the intermedial relationships 
and interdependencies between television and other mass media have to be taken 
into account, as they framed the invention of television as a new medium. 
With some exceptions, the historiography of modern mass media has been – up 
until now – dominated by two research perspectives: by the nation as primary 
frame of historical investigation and by a focus on single medium narratives. In 
addition, general histories tend to be fixated on the period of arrival of a «new» 
medium, overlooking the continuous existence and importance of the apparently 
«old» media. Although a number of authors have alluded to the pitfalls of this 
binary logic of «old» versus «new», and «pre-» versus «remediation»4, the tempta-
tion to reconstruct the history of media in a linear historical narrative of succession 
or even substitution of different media still seems to be strong. While national his-
tories of single media are undoubtedly legitimate in the context of the formation of 
national identity or political cultures and social movements, they are of limited use 
when trying to understand the role of mass media in the process of cultural mod-
ernisation and globalisation. This article claims that only a comparative and trans-
national perspective can elucidate the national specificities and transnational com-
munalities of media as agents of cultural transfer and mediators or catalysts of 
social or political debates.5 In addition, contemporary media historiography lacks 
an intermedial perspective that sheds light on the complex interrelationships 
between both the different media in the mass media ensemble and their synchro-
nous agency in modern history. Only such an intermedial perspective will pave the 
way for an integrative media historiography6 that analyses the complex processes 
of mutual reinforcement of different media, and critically historicises the continu-
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dia historiography, see J. Müller, «Intermedialität 
und Medienhistoriographie», in: J. Paech  / J. 
Schröter (eds.), Intermedialität – Analog  / Digital. 
Theorien, Methoden, Analysen, München 2008, 
31–46.  
 7 S. Holmes, «‹A friendly style of presentation 
which the BBC had always found elusive›. The 
1950s cinema programme and the construction of 
British television history», in: H. Wheatley (ed.), 
Re-Viewing Television History. Critical Issues in Tele-
vision Historiography, London 2007, 70.
 8 H. Jenkins, Convergence Culture. Where Old and 
New Media Collide, New York 2006. 
 9 B. Winston, Media, Technology and Society. A His-
tory: From the Telegraph to the Internet, London 
1998.
 10 S. Wurlitzer, Electric Sounds. Technological Change 
and the Rise of Corporate Mass Media, New York 
2007, 15; W. Uricchio, «Historicizing Media in 
Transition», in: D. Thorburn  / H. Jenkins (eds.), 
Rethinking Media Change. The Aesthetics of Transi-
tion, Cambridge 2004, 23–38.
 11 Wurlitzer, Electric Sounds, 69.
ous reinvention and remediation of all media (and not only the «new» medium) in 
moments of transition or change in the mass media ensemble.7 
While most of the recent studies looking at processes of remediation focus on 
the incorporation and appropriation of existing media products and practises into 
the new digital media following a logic of convergence,8 it is important to empha-
sise that these processes always involve mutual interference and transfer. The rise 
of television not only changed the fragile balance in the hitherto existing mass 
media ensemble but forced all mediums to reposition themselves and to react to 
the «threat» of the newcomer. The invention, development and implementation of 
a new communication technology and medium is by definition a phase of uncer-
tainty, of negotiation and of creative exploration.9 Steve Wurlitzer has explored the 
intermedial relationships of interrelated sound technologies of the 1920s and 
1930s (the sound cinema, the phonograph and the radio). He highlights the com-
plex and hybrid relationships between technologies as object, practise and dis-
course: «Upon their innovation, media technologies have multiple, often conflict-
ing identities. The ultimate meanings they take within social relations are the 
product of contestation and struggle. Various mechanisms – some economic or 
regulatory, others ideological or material – function to privilege one set of mean-
ings over others as media technology is successfully secured within social habits 
and practices».10  Instead of emphasising the «revolutionary» character of this pro-
cess, Wurlitzer shows that the grafting of electrical sound technology onto the 
existing institutions and practises of cinema and phonograph was «conservative», 
in an economic, aesthetic and technological sense. The material and rhetorical 
struggles to shape the identity of radio as a new medium led to a process of recon-
solidation within the existing media landscape – «institutional realignments 
related to technological change exacerbated ongoing consolidation within each 
industry» and forged the re-articulation of previously established positions on cul-
tural and political life.11
In a similar vein, this article intends to demonstrate that the emergence of tele-
vision must be interpreted as a conservative media revolution. What is meant by 
this term? It expresses in a short but punchy way the ambivalent status of an emerg-
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 12 T. P. Hughes, Networks of Power, Baltimore 1983.
 13 The term «reconstructive modernism» derives 
from the work of A. Schildt / A. Sywottek (eds.), 
Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau. Die westdeutsche 
Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre, Bonn 1993.
 14 A. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation Sta-
te, London 1992.
 15 Other examples of «radical innovations» are the 
transition from electronic tubes to transistors 
or from analogue to digital. For a concise and 
smart introduction to various theories of innova-
tion see H. Braun–Thürmann, Innovation, Biele-
feld 2005.
ing medium that was accompanied by a revolutionary rhetoric but in fact develop-
ing in a framework of conservative patterns. I want to pay particular attention to 
the conservative nature of television as a new technology, institution, and cultural 
form. The term «conservative» is used here in two different ways: First, it is used in 
a theoretical sense, highlighting the fact that television cannot be described as a 
«radical innovation», but must instead be interpreted as a «conservative innova-
tion». According to the concept of «conservative innovation», most technical inno-
vations improve or complement existing technologies and rarely offer radically 
new solutions.12 My argument builds on this idea and expands it to the institu-
tional, aesthetic and cultural dimension of television. 
Second, the term «conservative» is used in a normative sense. During the phase 
of reconstructive modernism,13 television gradually took over the role of new lead-
ing medium in the mass media ensemble. In this process of reconfiguration of the 
mass media ensemble, television distinguished itself as the legitimate successor of 
radio, which was previously the central actor of national community building. 
Focussing on the nation, the family and the home, television – at least in Western 
Europe and the United States – became both an object and vehicle for the (re)pro-
duction and dissemination of a conservative post-war ideology. To paraphrase the 
provocative thesis of Alan Milward, one could label television as the «moral rescue 
of the nation state».14 These patterns of conservative ideology are visible in the 
technological design of post-war television infrastructures, in the organisational 
profiles of television institutions and in the cultural products of television pro-
grammes. 
In the first part of this article, I will describe television’s emergence as a conser-
vative media revolution, following an intermedial approach. The second part will 
investigate television’s relationship to national and transnational spaces, both in a 
physical and mental sense. 
1. The Development of Television as a Conservative Innovation
Following Thomas P. Hughes› concept, the invention of television must be quali-
fied as a conservative innovation. The wireless transmission of moving pictures 
was an addition or complement to the radio rather than a radical transformation or 
technological alternative to it. While the transition from wired telegraphy to wire-
less broadcasting manifests the technological (not the institutional or economic) 
characteristics of a radical innovation,15 the joint transmission of sound and video 
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Nederland», in: H. Wijfjes / S. de Leeuw / B. Ho-
genkamp (eds.), De eeuw van beeld en geluid, Hil-
versum 2011, 82–119. 
 18 A.-K. Weber, «Du dispositif spectaculaire au poste 
standardisé: l’exposition de la télévision aux Fun-
kausstellungen berlinoises, 1928–1939», in: O. 
Lugon (ed.), Médias et expositions, Lausanne 2011 
(forthcoming).
 19 M. Elsner / T. Müller, «The early history of Ger-
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dium», in: Historical Journal of Film, Radio and 
Television 10 (1990) 3, 193–220.
 20 A. Johnston, «Television’s Here», in: The Saturday 
Evening Post, 6 May 1939, 8, quoted from J. Garth, 
«Dangling the dream? The presentation of televi-
sion to the American public, 1928–1952», in: His-
torical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 14 
(1994) 2, 137.
signals as «television» was a rather «logical consequence» of wireless technology. 
It is no wonder that early on, television was described as «Bildfunk» (Germany), 
«beeldradio» (Netherlands) or «wireless vision». The long history of technical 
exploration with television – from the first experiments with moving picture tele-
graphs in the 1880s to the implementation of electro-mechanical television sys-
tems in the 1930s – rooted television in the technological imagination long before 
it arrived.16 During this long experimental phase, television witnessed several 
deaths and resurrections.17 
The first television boom, most visible in the many public demonstrations of 
the new device as «technology of attraction» at industrial or radio fairs,18 ended in 
the early 1930s. The successful popularisation of television had fuelled the hope 
that the implementation of television was just around the corner. But it proved to 
be a long and winding road from successful experimentation with electro-
mechanical television devices based on the Nipkowdisc to the building of a 
professional television infrastructure. Not surprisingly, critical observers of 
television’s development began to question the euphoric promises of early televi-
sion pioneers and enthusiasts in the late 1920s. Eduard Rhein, a German who 
was one of the first radio and television critics wrote in the journal Fernsehen: 
«There we are standing, we, who looked up to the new coming miracle with wide 
eyes, quite disappointed, perhaps angry. What the daily press shouted at us – 
phrases! It is nothing! Whether progress is recorded, proved with differentials, 
integrals, slide-rules, curves – we can’t see it!» The German audience, which was 
first introduced to television at the Berlin broadcasting fairs in 1927 and 1928, 
longed for visible results.19 As the American journalist Alva Johnston wrote, tele-
vision had «suffered from its own prophets”: «Back in the 20’s it was taken for 
granted that television was only a year or two away. Warnings or difficulties had 
no effect; scientists were regarded as gods who could solve all problems with a 
turn of the wrist. […] Too much prophecy has made the magic box something of 
an anticlimax.»20 Considering that it took television 75 years to develop from a 
subject of visionary speculations to experimental object and finally household 
54 Andreas Fickers
 21 The first reference to television as revolutionary is 
to be found in R. Lee, Television: The Revolution, 
New York 1944.
 22 A. Fickers, «Broadcasting», in: A. Iriye / P. Y. 
Saunier (eds.), The Palgrave Dictionary of Transna-
tional History, Basingstoke 2009, 106–109.
 23 Stéphane Olivési speaks of radio as the «cadre 
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See S. Olivési, Histoire politique de la télévision, 
Paris 1998, 116.
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tory of a Concept», in: A. Goodwin / G. Whannel 
(eds.), Understanding Television, London 1990, 11–
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 26 C. Johnson / R. Turnock (eds.), ITV Cultures. Inde-
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consumer technology, the emergence of television must be interpreted as the 
result of a long-lasting evolutionary process rather than as a «technological revo-
lution».21 
2. Conservative Institutional Patterns of Television Development
From an institutional perspective, television grew within the existing organisa-
tional patterns of radio broadcasting. Nearly all over the world, television took 
shape within the existing model of radio broadcasting institutions, in all their pos-
sible varieties (commercial, public service or dual).22 These institutional environ-
ments influenced the way in which television was envisioned, organised, regu-
lated, financed, controlled, managed, produced, programmed, broadcasted, and 
even received. As the public service model became the dominant model of radio 
broadcasting in Western Europe, television as an audiovisual extension developed 
within this existing «structuring frame».23 The four paradigmatic forms of national 
public service broadcasting institutions in Western Europe were the paternalistic 
model of the BBC, the federal model of West Germany, the centralist model of 
France, and the pillarised model of the Netherlands. But the meaning of the term 
«public service» varied considerably.24 The British model of public broadcasting as 
embodied by the BBC – a model that many countries in the world admired – can 
best be characterised as paternalistic, aiming at educating, informing and enter-
taining people in a socially responsible, culturally dignified and politically «neu-
tral» way.25 What distinguished the British model was not so much this paternalis-
tic vision of television as a public service (similar attitudes can be found in many 
other countries) but rather the installation of a so-called dual system in 1954. The 
establishment of the Independent Television Authority (ITA), which controlled a 
network of private television production companies that provided the programmes 
for the commercial station ITV, was the specifically British outcome of long-lasting 
debates about the nature of television as a «public service».26 
France had a rather different idea of a public service broadcasting organisation 
and instituted a centralised model of public service with Paris (and literally the 
Eiffel Tower) as the radiating heart, and the state or government as the central 
authority.27 The control over radio and television broadcasting in France clearly 
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went beyond the exertion of authority in infrastructural and administrative mat-
ters. There was a broad consensus amongst politicians of the Fourth Republic that 
radio and television were to be used as legitimate instruments for the control and 
formation of public opinion. This view gained even more momentum after Gen-
eral de Gaulle came to power in 1958.28 While the governmental instrumentalisa-
tion of television in France was seen as legitimate in the highly politicised public 
debates of the chaotic Fourth Republic (at least by those in power), the western part 
of defeated Germany saw a different development. In West Germany, a federal 
model reemerged from the post-war occupation zones, designed to prevent any 
governmental control or abuse of the medium. While often seen as the result of 
American and British influences, the new broadcasting landscape was in fact a 
reconstitution of the federal structure of early Weimar radio broadcasting.29 In 
addition to the French or West German example, both strongly reflecting the geo-
political structures of their countries, other models were developed, such as the 
Dutch «pillarised» public service model.30 Here, the state (specifically, the Minis-
try for Post & Telecommunication) as in all other countries controlled the trans-
mission infrastructure of the national television network, but the programming 
was done by five different broadcasting organisations, representing the major reli-
gious and ideological groups in Dutch society.31 What ties these different variations 
of public service broadcasting models together, especially when compared to the 
commercial model of the United States, is the strong influence of political visions 
of television as an instrument for nation building and cultural radiance.
3. Televisual Aesthetic and the Remediation of Formats and Genres
With the arrival of television, broadcast officials, governmental administrations 
and industrial stakeholders in most countries debated whether television should 
be integrated into radio broadcasting, or if it should be «outsourced» as a commer-
cial activity beyond the responsibility of the state. During the «experimental 
phase»,32 broadcast organisations and within them television technicians and pro-
gramme producers experimented with a multitude of potential uses and audiences 
for television. This search for the medial identity of the new medium and its poten-
tial as a new form of mediated communication had its roots in the early days of 
television technology. But with the start of regular television broadcasts in Ger-
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 33 See J. Jacobs, An Intimate Screen: Early British Tele-
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many and Great Britain in the mid-1930s, experimentation with television shifted 
from an amateur and industrial environment mainly concerned with television as 
a new technology to a professional radio environment, interested in the experimen-
tation with television as a new medium. In pre-war Great Britain, where regular 
television broadcasts had started in 1936, the small but dedicated BBC television 
staff not only struggled with the invention of a new televisual style,33 but also with 
the delimitation of viewing expectations by the new television public. In order to 
test if television programmes would also work on sound broadcasting when accom-
panied with additional commentaries at the beginning of a transmission, the BBC 
started experimenting with the simultaneous transmission of television pro-
grammes on the vision and sound broadcasting channels in 1938. At the same 
time, they tested how viewers would react if the main radio news was retransmitted 
after the end of television broadcasts – an idea that grew out of the belief that televi-
sion viewers would feel like they had missed important information while sitting 
in front of the screen.34 
The negotiation of the medial identity of television drew not only on radio but 
also on cinema. Cinema probably came closest to what the average person expected 
of the new medium. As the popular discussions of the future of television in Dutch 
radio magazines and newspaper articles show, expectations of how television pro-
grammes should appear clearly derived from people’s familiarity with film. 
Although regular (experimental) television service didn’t start in the Netherlands 
until 1951, the late 1930s saw an intense debate on which needs television – if it 
should ever develop into a mass medium – would have to fulfil. A radio magazine 
article from March 1935 framed the horizon of expectation in terms of the cine-
matic dispositif: «We, spoiled children, will no longer be satisfied with something 
that is just half ready. We cannot – probably unconsciously – help but compare tele-
vision to film.»35 In a series of 19 articles published in the Dutch radio magazine 
AVRO Radiobode between March and July 1936, author Jan Geertsen critically 
reflected on the chances and pitfalls of television. Even if all the major technical 
and economic problems of television broadcasting could one day be solved, he con-
cluded, in a sceptical tone, that the quality of the programmes would determine 
whether or not the new medium would be accepted by the critical public: «Only 
when all the technical and economic challenges of television are solved, only then 
the ear will be followed by […] the eye. But what will the eye ask for? A lot! The eye 
represents the quality standards of the public. And these standards are based on 
the viewing experiences made with film and the listening habits of radio audi-
ences.»36 
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Thus, viewers› expectations were not only framed by listening and viewing hab-
its. The ground for the intellectual appropriation of television was prepared by the 
critical debate of the new medium in radio magazines and newspapers. The radio 
magazines, regardless of their status as official organ of broadcasting organisa-
tions line the Radio Times of the BBC or private publications like the German Hör 
zu!, were of crucial importance for the popularisation of television and offered a 
forum for the critical discussion of the identity of the new medium. As mediating 
interfaces between the broadcasting institutions and millions of listeners and 
viewers, radio magazines showcase the long and winding road of the public nego-
tiation of television’s place in the mass media ensemble.37 The readers of popular 
radio magazines were constantly confronted with journalistic conceptions of what 
television should be, how it should look or what its political and cultural mission 
ought to be. In doing so, journalists and critics constructed or invented an ideal 
type of «television viewer», reflecting their own experiences with and expectations 
of the new medium.38 These expectations were not only framed by their familiarity 
First cover of the BBC listener 
magazine Radio Times 1923. 
Source: BBC Written Archives, Caversham.
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with the intrinsic qualities of the medium of sound broadcasting (like the principle 
of «flow» in programming), but also by their «viewing socialisation» with the 
medium of film.39   
From an intermedial perspective, the interference between television and film 
constituted another important site of negotiation of TV’s identity. The question of 
whether television programmes should be shown in cinemas or theatres led to bat-
tles over the appropriate place for television consumption, and debates about legiti-
mate forms of public entertainment and their distribution.40 While broadcast insti-
tutions thought movie theatres were attractive venues for the public distribution 
and collective experience of live television programmes, the film industry tried to 
defend its territory and worried about the broadcasting of films on TV. This compe-
tition between film and television led to an interesting intermedial mixture in the 
United States with the advent of so-called «Television Theaters», where stakehold-
ers of the Hollywood movie fabric successfully, albeit temporarily, gained a foot-
hold in the emerging television business.41 By contrast, in Europe the situation was 
characterised by a clearer separation of the two media and by many attempts to 
establish an unambiguous demarcation of production spheres and distribution 
channels.42 An intertextual perspective, however, would reveal many cross-refer-
ences between the two mediums.43
But the intimate relationship between radio, television and cinema was not lim-
ited to the institutional or technical level. Looking at media personnel, it is impos-
sible to deny the massive migration of radio, film and theatre professionals to the 
rapidly expanding business of television.44 Both technicians and presenters moved 
from radio to television, importing their knowledge and practical experiences. Cos-
tume and stage designers were hired from theatres, and the art of make-up – which 
because of the extreme temperatures in the brightly lit studios was of great impor-
tance in the early days and became even more crucial with the introduction of 
colour television in the late sixties – was imported from cinema.45 It is not surpris-
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ing, then, that the migration of personnel also involved a transfer of knowledge and 
routines. This is most evident when looking at the repertoire of early television 
programming, which mainly consisted of adaptations of theatre plays (or their live 
transmission) or radio programmes (talk shows, quiz shows, soap operas, news, 
series, etc.), and the integration of films. As François Jost has demonstrated, the 
programming at the French national station RTF (Radio Télévision Française) 
between 1947 and 1951 was characterised by two complementary phenomena: the 
«televisualisation» of original radio programmes and the «cinematisation» of tele-
vision.46 These two phenomena can be observed in many other European coun-
tries as well (although they are not always well-documented). Successful radio for-
mats were adapted and many films imported – not least because the emerging 
television departments, part of institutions dedicated to sound broadcasting, were 
rather short on funds. The figures compiled by Jost also highlight the steady 
growth of news production. News became the genre that most adequately fulfilled 
the promise of television: to allow «distanced medial participation» in relevant 
political and social events.47 
Genre        Remediated Radio         Films                   News
                           Programmes
Percentage 1947 31,4 25,0 13,4
of this genre 1948 33,6 32,1 11,0
in total programme 1949          23,0 21,5 20,9
output 1950          12,0 12,8 43,0
 1951          10,9 16,3 36,1
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A quality that distinguished television from other media was its live transmission, 
since the first professional recording technologies for video signals only appeared 
in the late 1950s.  The inability to videotape imposed a rather limited televisual aes-
thetic: static images and limited studio settings predominated. Many early televi-
sion formats mirror this limited aesthetic potential of the new medium and thus 
relativize the creative potential of television as a new art form.48 The «television of 
attraction» was reduced to a small number of outside broadcasts – especially sport-
ing events.49 Moreover, up until the late sixties, it was radio that covered most of 
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these events «live», whereas television offered short filmed sequences in the eve-
ning news programmes. Technical hurdles, financial implications and – most of 
all – the restricted daily hours of television programming made television much 
less of a live medium than radio was. Other technological restraints – the limited 
light sensitivity of cameras, their heavy weight and the difficulties of catching the 
sound of dialogue without having the microphones in the picture – all contributed 
to a depleted visual aesthetic of the medium of television compared to film.50
What has often been described as a typical or original quality of television the 
planned combination and sequential composition of different genres and formats 
or «flow» was in fact typical for radio broadcasting. The programming and sched-
uling of early television can instead be interpreted as a successful remediation of 
the existing repertoire of formats, genres and programmes in the fields of medi-
ated information, education and entertainment. This in a literal sense «conserva-
tive» (preserving) function of television was one of the big challenges in the search 
for a distinctive identity of television in the mass media ensemble. In reassessing 
the «newness» or «distinctiveness» of early television as a new medium, Marie-
France Chambat-Houillon comes to the conclusion that one has to differentiate 
between two «births» of television: a first one representing the strong intermedial 
identity of television as an emerging medium (characterised by radio and theatre 
adaptions and the incorporation of films), and a second one based on the creative 
development of a distinct televisual style, mainly characterised by a specific aes-
thetic of liveness.51 It was only during the second birth that television succeeded in 
adding an «original» contribution to the existing mass media ensemble, both in 
terms of content and mediated experiences.
4. Television as Mirror and Multiplier of Conservative Values 
If the advent of television was deeply embedded in existing institutional patterns, 
and aesthetic and stylistic conventions, how could TV function as an agent of cul-
tural modernisation? Did television really have a modernising effect in post-war 
European societies, or did it promote conservative norms and values, both as cul-
tural form and social institution? I argue the latter. The medium was a mirror and 
catalyst of the conservative Zeitgeist during the age of «reconstructive modernisa-
tion» in post-war European societies.52 The televised «norms and values» in the 
long 1950s reflected conservative political and moral beliefs that dominated most 
post-war European societies.53 Family series and variety shows reproduced and 
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amplified the post-war ideal of family togetherness and depoliticised spare time 
entertainment.54 
The home became the preferred place to consume mediated electronic enter-
tainment and information, and the slow but steady rise of television challenged the 
predominance of cinema as the privileged form of outside visual entertainment. 
Despite the fact that the early days of television were characterised by a high degree 
of «public viewing”55 and a long period of uncertainty about screening technology 
(large-screen projection television to be shown in cinemas, or small screen sets for 
the home)56, domestic viewing was seen as the future of television broadcasting. 
The enormous success of television in the United States, where television had 
always been viewed as a medium for home entertainment and not for public infor-
mation or education, convinced most European critics that the future of television 
was a domestic one.57 As central pillars in the moral recovery of post-war nation 
states, the family as «societal nucleus» and television as a new «electronic hearth» 
of the home formed a successful and powerful alliance, and played an important 
role in the process of «reconstructive modernisation».58 It was only during the sec-
ond half of the 1960s and in the 1970s that television developed its repertoires of 
critical journalism, establishing it as the primary medium for public social and 
political debate. As Chris Vos has shown, television – especially in matters of infor-
mation and news – started as a loudspeaker or propagandist of governmental inter-
ests and only slowly took a critical stance toward the political powers.59 Outside of 
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Britain, one had to wait until the late 1960s before political magazines and current 
affair programmes developed a critical journalistic attitude and established them-
selves as important actors in the political public sphere.60 
Taken all together, the conservative nature of television as a new medium 
becomes evident. The historicisation of the emergence of television from a techni-
cal, intermedial, institutional and cultural perspective allows one to interpret the 
advent of television as an evolutionary process, characterised by conservative pat-
terns of development. While contemporaries in the 1950s believed in TV’s revolu-
tionary potential as a ‹window on the world›, our approach challenges the common 
ideological connotations of «newness» inscribed into television as a technology 
and cultural form.61 Instead of «bringing the world into the home» – as  was repeat-
edly suggested by television advertisements – television was in fact instrumental in 
shrinking «the world» to the political borders and social space of the nation. It did 
so both for techno-political and cultural reasons.
The first «TV family» of British television:  
The Grove Family (produced and transmitted  
live by the BBC 1954–1957). 
Source: BBC Audiovisual Archives, Brentford.
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5. A Global Time-out? Television in Search of the Nation
The popular press and the advertising industry celebrated the advent of television 
as the final realisation of an old dream of mankind: seeing into the distance. The 
German term for television, Fernsehen, literally refers to this act of seeing into the 
distance. From the 1870s on, terms like «seeing by electricity» or «distant electric 
vision» circulated in scientific and popular journals, and television seemed like yet 
another technical miracle to be realised in the very near future.62 Despite the fact 
that it took more than 60 years to turn the vision of television into reality, the cen-
tral metaphor of «window to the world» did not lose any of its appeal –  at least 
when looking at the iconography of television advertisements in the 1950s. 
As the first Philips advertisement from 1954 demonstrates, the slogan of the 
«window on the world» was not only used as a literary metaphor, but often as a cen-
tral motive in the invention of a televisual iconography in advertising.63 The screen 
turned into a magic mirror or translucent interface, inviting the viewer to become 
an «armchair Columbus» and to stand «face to face» with the world. The DuMont 
advertisement published in the magazine The Billboard in August 1944 stated: 
«You’ll sail with television through vanishing horizons into exciting new worlds. 
You’ll be an intimate of the great and near-great. You’ll sit at speakers› tables at his-
Left: Philips television advertisement from 1954 using the metaphor  
of television as «window to the world» as artistic theme. The poster was  
developed by the Philips advertisement department in Eindhoven  
for the start of Eurovision in July 1954. Source: Philips Company Archives, Eindhoven.
Right:  «You’ll be an armchair Columbus». DuMont television advertisment  
from 1944. Source: The Billboard (19.08.1944), p. 9.
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toric functions, down front at every sporting event, at all top-flight entertainment. 
News flashes will bring you coverage of parades, fires and floods, of everything 
odd, unusual and wonderful, and bring them to you as though you were there […] 
All this – the world actually served to you on a silver screen – will be most enjoyably 
yours when you own a DuMont Television-Radio Receiver. […] the touchstone that 
will make you an armchair Columbus on the thousand-and-one thrilling voyages of 
discovery!»64
As a «medial duplication of the world» (Theodor W. Adorno), television seemed 
to offer a new and privileged entry into reality.65 The visual aspect of television gave 
it – at least in the eyes of early television critics – a quality in the perception of real-
ity that transcended the sense of medial participation offered by other media. It 
seemed to offer «more reality» than radio or the printed press.66 This exaggeration 
of the newness and revolutionary potential of television is a recurrent topos in the 
long history of «new media». Public discourse surrounding the emergence of a new 
medium usually follows stable patterns, characterised by exaggerated hopes and 
fears about the impact of the newcomer on society and culture.67 Television adver-
tising reproduced many of the slogans originally developed for the promotion of 
radio broadcasting. During the 1920s, radio was presented as an «ear to the world», 
bringing the world into people’s homes.68 It came with the «fascination of avail-
ability», and promised simultaneity and the «opening of the home to the world».69 
Screenshots of the BBC current affair programme »Panorama: The Weekly Window on the World«.
Source: BBC Audiovisual Archives, London.
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In contrast to radio, early television never fulfilled the promise of being a win-
dow to the world. Instead of reaching out for the world, television was very much 
focused on the nation as the main addressee and object of televisual representa-
tion. From a media perspective, the long 1950s witnessed an interesting reshaping 
of the broadcasting sphere. While television gradually expanded its coverage from 
a local to a regional and finally a national dimension, radio broadcasting – because 
of the emergence and implementation of FM radio – developed from a transna-
tional and national medium into a more regionally or locally structured one.70 In 
fact, the «golden age» of television marks a phase of global time-out in broadcast-
ing. Both the strict national borders of television infrastructure and the regionali-
sation of radio with the successful implementation of FM radio turned the transna-
tional broadcast landscape of the interwar years into a rather closed national 
broadcasting space in the post-war years.71 Sure, this structural change of the 
broadcast sphere occurred at different rates and with varying degrees of implemen-
tation. But a comparative topographical analysis of the coverage of the different 
broadcast media points to a structural change in the audiovisual mass media land-
scape in the 1950s and 1960s. Long and medium wave radio broadcasting had 
established a transnational communication space in Europe in the 1920s, and the 
introduction of short wave radio in the 1930s had made radio a truly global 
medium.72 But with the introduction of FM radio and television, broadcasting 
entered the era of very high (VHF, 30–300 MHz) and ultra-high frequencies (UHF, 
0,3 – 3 GHz). As the spread of electromagnetic waves diminishes with increasing 
frequency, the propagation of both FM radio and television signals is much shorter 
than with AM (long, medium and short wave) radio signals. Without either a cable 
network or a dense network of so-called relay stations where the VHF or UHF sig-
nals are being received, amplified and retransmitted, nationwide coverage would 
not be possible.73 
The main preoccupation of those bodies responsible for the transmission of 
television signals during the 1950s – mainly the national post and telecommunica-
tion authorities – was therefore to gradually expand the television signals› coverage 
of national territories. This was both a technical challenge and a strategic mission. 
Because of the limited spread of VHF and UHF frequencies, television signals 
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could only be received in an average ambit of 80 km (depending on the geophysical 
nature of the landscape). In order to build up a national television network, a chain 
of strong regional transmitters and many relay stations were needed. As the exam-
ple of Great Britain shows, the development of a nationwide television transmitter 
infrastructure was dependent on three factors: The budget of the Post & Telecom-
munication administration; the decision of whether to build the network on cable 
or based on radio links; and the establishment of a national broadcasting institu-
tion able to provide the programmes needed to boost the attraction of the new 
medium. The BBC pushed strongly for national coverage «at the earliest practica-
ble moment»,74 and the Television Advisory Committee (TAC) finally backed this 
position by recommending a stepwise expansion of the national television infra-
structure. The goal of the TAC was to bring television to approximately 40 million 
viewers in 1954 (i.e., 80 per cent of the population).75 As the following map shows, 
a network of high power transmitter stations (marked as BBC transmitter stations) 
and radio repeater stations were to ensure national coverage through a combina-
tion of cable and radio links.
The fast development of a national television infrastructure was also of strate-
gic interest for the radio industry. The technical experience provided by the estab-
lishment and operation of a network of television links would be «most valuable 
both in relation to the home service and as a selling point in the export of television 
apparatus», Sir Alan Barlow, second joint secretary of treasury suggested in 1946. 
Keeping Britain «in the forefront in development of television» and to «maintain 
our pre-war head over U.S.A. in television» would deliver «substantial export guar-
antees».76 The economic promises of television as a new industry provoked a 
techno-political battle between the major players in the European television land-
scape.77  Triggered by a «first mover» logic, or the notion that being first on the 
market would considerably enhance a country’s chances of successfully dissemi-
nating and implementing a specific television system, all the major players in the 
European television industry and administration fiercely promoted their line stan-
dard for black and white television in Europe. While Britain advocated its pre-war 
standard of 405 lines, the French introduced a «high definition» standard (819 
lines) in 1949. The influential Dutch radio manufacturer Philips promoted a 567–
line system, developed by the multinational as a European variant of the American 
525–line system. Yet another alternative, 625–line system, originally developed by 
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Russian television engineers, was backed by West Germany and Switzerland. The 
result of this techno-nationalist struggle for television standards was a technically 
fragmented European television landscape. The different line standards seriously 
complicated the transnational radiance of television programmes and the use of 
equipment, which presented an obstacle to the ambitions of early Eurovision 
enthusiasts.78  
The post-war line standard debate must be interpreted as a techno-political 
conflict of technical, symbolic and economic importance. Because of the network 
structure of television as a large technical system, the definition of a line standard 
directly impacted the technical parameters and characteristics of the production, 
transmission and reception technologies of television. Fuelled by techno-national-
ist reasoning, all the major players in the field of television technology promoted 
their standard with a strange mixture of protectionist (securing the home market) 
and expansionist (exporting domestic technology) arguments. This shows how 
economic, industrial, political and even cultural norms and values are inscribed 
into the apparently neutral characteristics of a technical standard.79 This techno-
political instrumentalisation of early television technology complicated the devel-
opment of a transnational European television infrastructure and catalysed the 
renationalisation of the European broadcasting sphere in the 1950s. Techno-
nationalism paired with protectionist industrial policies therefore constituted a 
serious setback for ambitions to make television an instrument of transnational or 
global communication.80  
6. The Nation On and Behind the Screens of Television
The question remains as to why television was perceived as a technology that tran-
scended boundaries on a global level while in fact presenting a very national view 
of the world. What made television attractive if one looks beyond the rhetoric of 
advertisements? One important reason for the popularity of television was its 
promise to function as a mode of political address and communication. Based on 
the experience with radio broadcasting, all European governments recognised the 
potential of television to serve as a means of political communication and propa-
ganda. Opening ceremonies and anniversaries of television services, or the yearly 
radio and television fairs were often used to spread ideas about the role and func-
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tion of television in society. At the Düsseldorf Radio Fair in August 1953, the direc-
tor of the NWDR (the North-West German Broadcasting Organisation), Adolf 
Grimme, declared that television had to be interpreted as the «electronic agora», 
the return of direct democracy in the age of mass media.81 His French homologue 
Gabriel Delaunay, director of the RTF (Radio Télédiffusion Française), published 
an article entitled «La radio-télévision: puissance politique», in which he compared 
the role of television with the ancient function of the forum. According to Delau-
nay, the television was now the new electronic forum that had to find its entrance 
into every home.82 French television indeed created a new link between ordinary 
people and the president; it coined a «national language» and became a catalyst for 
communion and for the shaping of national sentiments.83 
This is certainly true for other countries, although the French example is espe-
cially interesting as it highlights the tensions between the democratic potential of 
the medium on the one side and the danger of political instrumentalisation on the 
other. While television had a rather cumbersome start under the Fourth Republic, 
The fragmented European tv landscape of different line-standards in black & white 
television. 
Source: H. Rindfleisch, Der gegenwärtige Ausbau des Fernsehrundfunks im In- und Ausland, in: 
Rundfunktechnische Mitteilungen 3 (1959), 220.
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the rise of General de Gaulle as president in 1958 gave impetus to the development 
of television in France. De Gaulle himself was acutely aware of the political power 
of television. During the first two years of his presidency, he delivered no fewer 
than 32 televisual addresses to the nation and thereby managed to mutate from an 
already legendary «radio preacher» into a no less impressive «television priest». As 
he wrote in his memoirs, it was by means of sound and vision that he felt himself 
closely connected to the nation.84 Probably more than any other European politi-
cian of his time, de Gaulle recognised the importance of television as a political 
tool and powerful instrument of social and cultural education. In a private conver-
sation with his Minister of Information, Alain Peyrefitte, de Gaulle confessed: 
«Who holds television holds the nation.»85 
A fine example of the public celebration of the national importance of radio and 
television in France under de Gaulle is the inauguration of the Radio Télédiffusion 
Française’s (RTF) new building on 14 December 1963. Here, Alain Peyrefitte and 
de Gaulle addressed the participating honoraries of the French political and cul-
tural elite, and stressed the significance of radio and television as tools for the for-
mation and representation of the grand French nation. Peyrefitte compared the 
advent of radio and television to the arrival of book printing, and praised the build-
ing’s modern architecture as a symbol of the «civilisation of sound and image». 
But this civilisation needed to be closely controlled and observed.86 For Peyrefitte 
– whose critics accused him of being the first censor in the country – radio and tele-
vision was first of all «une affaire d’État – au sens le plus noble du terme». Like 
Peyrefitte, de Gaulle aligned television with the other great inventions in commu-
nication – from literature, drawing, theatre, print, photography and cinema to 
radio, and stressed the enormous responsibility of those operating with these 
instruments of «collective intelligence». For de Gaulle, there was a national respon-
sibility in the use of television as the RTF «breeds our spirit, expresses itself in our 
language, holds our technology, evokes people and things of our country and ful-
fills a unique role of national representation». De Gaulle concluded his speech by 
emphasising the double role of broadcasting as a mirror of the nation and a projec-
tion of French identity onto the outside world.87  
This political interpretation of television as a means of national identity forma-
tion was a characteristic pattern in the television discourses of the 1950s. Even the 
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BBC, usually credited for its «objective» and unagitated style, said its prime mis-
sion was to serve the nation – that is, the United Kingdom and the Common-
wealth.88 When the Television Act of 1954 set out to establish a commercial televi-
sion service in Britain, the BBC tried to defend its «special position» by referring to 
the national duty of its service. «In times of stress», it said in a long position paper 
of January 1955, «it is not the regional interests which matter, but the national 
interest as a whole, and in that respect the great strength of British Broadcasting 
Top: The new radio and television centre of the Radio 
Télédiffusion Française (RTF), inaugurated by the French 
President Charles de Gaulle (Bottom) on the 14th of 
December 1963. 
Source: EBU Archives, Geneva. 
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has lain in the standing of the BBC as a national institution, with the power to 
unite, through broadcasting, the whole people».89 In March 1958, the director gen-
eral of the BBC summarized the mission of the BBC as follows: «We must do a 
national job. […] We must be serious without being stuffy […] We must faithfully 
reflect the greatness of our nation. […] We shall do our best to make the next 
twenty-one years in Television adventurous and exciting, and to make our service 
something of real value to the nation.»90
Only the complex interplay between technological infrastructures,91 institu-
tional arrangements and cultural ambitions made national coverage and address 
possible. The creation of umbrella organisations such as the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD) 
in Germany in 1950 or the Nationale Televisie Stichting (NTS) in the Netherlands in 
1951, responsible for the organisation and scheduling of a national television pro-
gramme, was a crucial prerequisite for the construction of a national audience. In 
both countries, the collaborative realisation of a national programme by indepen-
dent broadcast institutions – not least because of the financial limitations of these 
regional or pillarised organisations and the huge costs of television productions – 
promoted the integration of a fragmented television landscape. In Germany, the 
ARD started its first common programme in November 1954 and called it 
«Deutsches Fernsehen» (German Television). After the launch of ZDF (Zweites 
Deutsches Fernsehen) in 1963, the ARD was renamed «Erstes Deutsches Fernse-
hen».92 As this example shows, the names of the collaborative programmes sug-
gest their national reach and representation. In the Netherlands, this «forced» col-
laboration between the ideologically competing broadcasting organisations is said 
to have been an important catalyst in the process of «de-pillarisation» of Dutch 
society.93 
Finally, the nationalisation of television was not only shaped by technological 
infrastructures and institutional arrangements, but also by the televised content 
itself. During the long 1950s, the television screen became the preferred platform 
for the staging of the nation. Television staples such as the evening news or pro-
grammes for children grew into important focal points in people’s private lives and 
became synchronising pulse-generators of social life. Family series for the domes-
tic audience served as public forums for the negotiation of a nation’s moral stan-
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dards, and entertainment formats – such as quiz shows or variety shows – allowed 
for interaction between the viewers at home and the «imagined community» of the 
general audience.94 Last but not least, history programmes on television became 
one of the most popular vehicles for the (re)invention of the nation.95 Both behind 
and on the screen, television acted as an important propagator of behavioural 
norms, social standards and political opinions. It is this intimate relationship 
between television and the project of nation building that seriously complicated or 
even prevented the development of a transnational televisual space in the long 
1950s and beyond. 
7. Conclusion
The aim of this article was to demonstrate the ambivalent status of television as an 
emerging medium, a status that was characterised by a constant tension between 
the potential of television to become a «window to the world» and its use as a tool 
to serve national interests, and by a tension between its status as a «parasitic 
medium» and its creative potential as a new form of artistic expression.96 Even 
before people could experience the new medium as a reality of daily life, a techno-
political struggle for line standards had transformed the European television land-
scape into a highly fragmented space. The hope that television would bring the 
world into the home by means of transborder reception and transnational pro-
gramme exchange was – from very early on – frustrated by protectionist industrial 
strategies. Political ambitions turned the medium into a privileged agent of 
national socialisation and – at least in some cases – governmental instrumentalisa-
tion. When compared to the truly transnational nature of radio broadcasting (at 
least before the crowding out of middle and short wave radio by the regional imple-
mentation of FM radio in the 1970s), television – both in its infrastructural, institu-
tional and cultural manifestations – heralded a phase of renationalisation of the 
broadcasting space. Somewhat provocatively, one could describe this phase – which 
lasted until the breakthrough of commercial and satellite television in the late 
1980s – as a global time-out in the history of European broadcasting.97 
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With its strong emphasis on the nation, the home and the family, television 
played an important role during the moral and material recovery of the European 
continent after the Second World War: it functioned as a catalyst in the process of 
renationalisation of the post-war broadcasting landscape. Surprisingly, it was the 
written-off medium of radio that became the central agent of cultural modernisa-
tion in both Western and Eastern Europe during the 1950s and 1960s. In terms of 
programming (the advent of the format radio), technology (FM) and usage (mobil-
ity thanks to the transistor radio), radio successfully reinvented its medial identity 
and became the vehicle of a new youth and consumer culture.98 Together with pop-
ular magazines, the disc record and the cinema, radio acted as a powerful mediator 
in the transfer of political and cultural norms and values not only between America 
and Western Europe, but also across the Iron Curtain.99 
To conclude, the intermedial and comparative approach to media history advo-
cated here aims at deconstructing the early dispositif of television, stressing its 
manifold material interdependencies, structural relationships and cultural or aes-
thetic affinities with other media. In historicising this process of remediation, two 
central characteristics became evident: the conservative nature of this evolutionary 
process in terms of innovation patterns, and the strong nationalistic bent of televi-
sion as an infrastructure, public service and cultural form. The highly symbolic 
meaning of television as an apparently «revolutionary» technology and agent of 
cultural modernisation made television an object used for national staging – from 
technical standards to political rhetoric. The transnational or global potential of 
television, although repeatedly used in advertising campaigns by the television 
industry and as a stable metaphor in early television discourse, was the most prom-
inent victim of this renationalisation of the European broadcasting space. Instead 
of fulfilling the promise of opening a «window to the world», television – both in 
its coverage and content – was actually a key player in the «rescue of the nation 
state» in post-war Europe.
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The Emergence of Television as a  
Conservative Media Revolution:  
Historicising a Process of Remediation  
in the Post-war Western European Mass Media Ensemble
This article claims that the emergence of television in the 1950s must be interpreted 
as a conservative media revolution. It aims at revisiting some of the popular narra-
tives about the emergence of television as a revolutionary moment in media history 
and questions the newness of television in the European mass media ensemble. 
Focusing on a set of privileged sites of negotiation where the tensions between the 
conservative and modernising agencies of the medium became most visible or 
explicit, the article emphasizes the ambiguous and contested nature of television 
as a new medium. Finally, the author pleas for an integral approach to media history 
that studies the intermedial relationships and interdependencies between televi-
sion and other mass media.
 
Das Aufkommen des Fernsehens als  
konservative Medienrevolution:  
Historisierung eines Prozesses von Remediation 
im westeuropäischen massenmedialen Ensemble  
der Nachkriegszeit  
Das Aufkommen des Fernsehens in den 1950er Jahren muss – so die These dieses 
Artikels – als konservative Medienrevolution interpretiert werden. Dabei sollen 
einige der verbreiteten Erzählungen wie das Aufkommen des Fernsehens als revolu-
tionäres Ereignis der Mediengeschichte bzw. die Neuartigkeit des Fernsehens im 
europäischen massenmedialen Ensemble hinterfragt und überdacht werden. Indem 
sich der Artikel auf eine Reihe von Verhandlungsorten konzentriert, anhand der sich 
die Spannungen zwischen konservativen und modernisierenden Kräften des Medi-
ums besonders gut erkennen lassen, betont er den ambivalenten und umstrittenen 
Charakter des Fernsehens als neues Medium. Zum Schluss entwirft der Autor einen 
integrierenden mediengeschichtlichen Ansatz, der sowohl die intermedialen Bezie-
hungen als auch die Wechselwirkungen zwischen dem Fernsehen und anderen Mas-
senmedien berücksichtigt.                     
L’émergence de la télévision en tant que  
révolution médiatique  
conservatrice: L’historicisation d’un processus  
de remediation dans l’ensemble ouest-européen des 
médias de masse de l’après-guerre  
L’émergence de la télévision dans les années 1950 doit, telle est l’hypothèse de 
l’article, être interprétée en tant que révolution médiatique conservatrice. L’objec-
tif est de revisiter les récits populaires faisant de l’émergence de la télévision un 
instant révolutionnaire de l’histoire des médias tout en s’interrogeant sur la nou-
veauté de la télévision dans l’ensemble des médias de masse en Europe. En se 
concentrant sur une série de lieux de négociations rendant les tensions entre les 
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forces conservatrices et modernisatrices du médium plus visibles ou plus expli-
cites, l’article souligne la nature ambigüe et contestée de la télévision en tant que 
nouveau médium. Enfin, l’auteur plaide pour une approche intégrée de l’histoire 
des médias qui étudie non seulement les relations entre les médias, mais aussi les 
interdépendances entre la télévision et les autres médias de masse. 
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